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The justification of using GNP per capita as a measure of economic development
is utilitarian ethics plus an assumption that no needs are more urgent than others.  Here,
we advocate a measure of economic development based on the degree to which the
society in question has equalized opportunities for the acquisition of income.  In highly
developed economies, inequality of opportunity accounts for less than 10% of total
inequality, while in developing economies, it accounts for over 30%.
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1.   Introduction
 There is a long tradition that measures the level of economic development of a
country by its per capita income, and its rate of economic development as the rate of
growth of per capita income.    This tradition has been challenged by those who argue
that income is an imperfect proxy for human capacities or the standard of living;  among
these challengers,  Amartya Sen is perhaps the most prominent, and the human
development index (HDI),  computed, now, for many years and many countries by the
UNDP and published in its annual Human Development Report, is the most popular
alternative measure to the classical one.
I wish, also, to challenge the view that income per capita is the appropriate
measure of economic development, but my challenge will be orthogonal to one just
described.  I will not argue, here, that income is a poor proxy for human flourishing, but
rather, that income per capita is not the way to judge the level of development of a
society.    My argument will be that using per capita income as the measure of
development flows from a particular, highly contentious  philosophical view concerning
how to measure social welfare, and that a more attractive philosophical view – that we
should measure economic development by the extent to which a society equalizes
opportunities – implies a different measure.
2.  Utilitarianism and per capita income
As economists,  our interest in economic development is corollary to our interest
in progress in human welfare.   We would not call an economy highly developed which
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possessed a wonderful technology, but dumped its entire product into the sea, save for a
pittance used to feed the labor force to keep production going.    Thus our measure of
economic development cannot be simply technological, but must be corollary to our
conception of how sensibly to measure social welfare.
Taking income per capita as the measure of the level of development is most
easily justified by two premises:  (1) that our theory of social welfare is utilitarian – that
is, that we seek to maximize the total or average welfare in a society, and (2) that the
measure of individual welfare is proportional to the individual’s income.    The first
premise says that, if ui (xi ) is the welfare of individual i if he receives income xi , then
social welfare is given by ui∑ (xi ) ; the second premise says we choose ui (x) = ax  for
some positive number a.   It follows that a society should attempt to maximize a xi∑ , or






∑ ,  over all feasible distributions of income.
This is, of course, just income per capita.
Even given the first premise of utilitarianism, the second premise is questionable.
If some human needs are more urgent than others, then it stands to reason that marginal
utility should be a decreasing function of income.    To reflect this, suppose we chose,
instead, ui (x) = log x ; then the utilitarian mandate would be to maximize log xi∑ , which
is equivalent to maximizing the product of incomes, not their sum.    Clearly, this choice
of utility function puts a much greater emphasis on avoiding very small incomes than the
first one.    To wit, if anyone has a zero income, than social welfare under this construal is
negative infinity, as small as it can possibly be, while in the first formulation, we might
well end up recommending that some unproductive souls receive zero income.
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So it is utilitarianism plus a contentious view that no needs are more urgent than
other needs that generates ‘per capita income’ as the measure of economic development.
One might reply to this critique that economic development should be measured
by the technological sophistication of the society, its capacity to turn inputs into outputs,
and that it is up to society to figure out how to harness that development to advance
human welfare.    It was to disarm this challenge that I gave above the example of the
slave-like society that dumps its product into the sea.   I insist upon a distinction between
technological and economic development.   An economy is not just a machine for
producing goods: it is a method of organizing production and distribution for the
satisfaction of human wants.
3.  Equality of opportunity
During the past forty years,  political philosophy has turned sharply away from
utilitarianism as a theory of justice, or as a measure of social welfare.   That turn may be
marked, most easily,  by the publication of John Rawls’s (1971) magnum opus.  Rawls
proposed that we measure the welfare of a society by the ‘primary goods’ available to its
worst-off member.    For present purposes,  it does no harm to interpret this as the
income, or consumption, of its worst off member.
In fairly short order, Rawls’s proposal was challenged from two different
directions.  Sen (1981) argued that Rawls was wrong to be concerned with the goods
people received: better, he said, to be concerned with how well people could function
with those goods.    So, to make a long story short, Sen’s proposal was that social welfare
should be measured by the capacity to function of its worst-off members  (those for
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whom that capacity was smallest).  The second challenge came from Ronald Dworkin
(1981), who argued that Rawls had ignored the issue of personal responsibility.   The
goods a person receives (think of these being income, for short) are a consequence in part
of personal choices for which, ethically, it is appropriate to hold the individual
responsible.    Inequalities which result from such well-informed choices are not morally
bad.    Dworkin advocated what he called ‘equality of resources,’ a doctrine in which
individuals are compensated for paucity of resources assigned by the natural lottery
(including, importantly, the resources supplied by the individual’s family), but not for the
consequences of choices that flow from the individual’s well-considered, adult
preferences.   Exactly how to define what distributions of income and wealth satisfy this
criterion is a tricky business, about which much has been written in the last 25 years.
(For a partial summary, see Roemer (1996).)
In 1989, two philosophers,  Richard Arneson and G.A. Cohen, reacted to
Dworkin’s proposal: they proposed that, although his criticism of Rawls was cogent, his
remedy was not quite right.   Arneson proposed that the right approach was to equalize
opportunities for welfare.
Space constraints prevent me from reporting more fully on this active period in
political philosophy.   In the remainder of this section, I will describe how I attempted
(1996, 1998) to apply the insights from the philosophical debate to construct an algorithm
with which one could compute what policy, in a given situation, equalizes opportunities
in a society for the acquisition of some desirable state, or kind of advantage.   I will then
apply this approach to economic development.
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There is a population, and we are concerned with evaluating, from an ethical
viewpoint, the distribution of some kind of advantage in it: that advantage could be
income, educational achievement, health status, wage-earning capacity, or even welfare,
if we could construct a measure of it.    Advantage is an outcome, thought to be of value,
by the society or agency which is carrying out the analysis.    Let me specialize to the
case where advantage is something objective – like income or educational achievement –
as this will avoid knotty problems of individual and idiosyncratic conceptions of welfare.
It is a useful abstraction to think of the advantage that an individual ends up acquiring or
achieving as a function of his or her circumstances and effort,  where circumstances are
environmental factors,  either social or biological, and effort comprises the set of actions
that we view to be under the control of the individual.    In addition to circumstances and
effort, the advantage level a person achieves will be a function of the policy that the
agency or country adopts.     Thus, to summarize, we may write the level of advantage
acquired by the person as a function u(c,e,ϕ )  where c is a vector of circumstances, e is a
vector of efforts or choices by the person, and ϕ  is the policy, chosen from set of feasible
policies Φ .    I assume that the function u is universal across the population, although
that could be modified.
For purposes of analysis, it is usually necessary to partition the population in
question into a fairly small set of types or groups, where a type is a set of individuals all
of whom have the same circumstances.    For example, we may choose the single
circumstance of parental educational level, and then partition the population into three or
four types, defined by the level of their parents’ education.
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Suppose, for specificity, that u is wage-earning capacity; we are concerned how
individuals from different family backgrounds acquire that capacity.   The policies, in this
case, might be different choices of how to distribute educational finance monies in the
society – in poor societies, one might be particularly concerned with the allocation of
educational finance between primary and more advanced schooling, where increasing the
investment in primary schooling might help most the most disadvantaged type.
Associated with any policy there will ensue a distribution of efforts in each type.     If the
types are denoted 1,2,…,T,   and if we simplify by assuming that effort can be
summarized by a number, then we may denote the distribution function of effort in type t
if the policy is ϕ  by Fϕ
t  -- a cumulative distribution function on the non-negative real
numbers.
The philosophical idea behind equality of opportunity, as it emerged from the
literature I mentioned above, is that individuals should not be held responsible for their
circumstances, but it is morally acceptable to hold them responsible for their effort.
Effort, however, is a complex thing, and the question arises as to how to measure it.   The
approach I have taken is as follows.   First, effort should be measured relative to the
effort of other individuals in one’s own type.    Thus, suppose we think of effort, in the
wage-earning capacity example, as the number of years of schooling the individual
chooses to acquire.  There is surely personal choice involved in this: but that choice is
also influenced by circumstances.  Thus the distribution of effort is itself a circumstance,
it is a characteristic of the type.    In measuring an individual’s effort, we should attempt
to sterilize out that aspect of effort that is attributable to circumstance.   A simple way of
doing so is to identify an individual’s degree of effort with the quantile which he or she
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occupies on the distribution of advantage of his or her type.    Thus, if A and B occupy
quantiles 0.5 and 0.7, respectively,  on the distribution of wage-earning capacity of the
type to which they both belong, then we say B has applied higher effort.    This requires
only that it be the case that greater effort leads to a higher level of the advantage in
question, holding circumstances fixed.   (This assumption is not innocuous – it rules out
‘luck’ as a cause of advantage.)   Perhaps more contentiously, we say that if A and C both
occupy the 0.5 quantile on the distribution of wage-earning capacities of the different
types to which they belong, then we assert they have exerted the same degree of effort.
We now say: Equality of opportunity for the acquisition of advantage of the kind
u measures has been achieved if, at every level of effort, the levels of advantage across
types are the same.   In other words, given the discussion above, if the cumulative
distribution functions of advantage across types are identical.   More generally we say
that a policyϕ1  equalizes opportunities for advantage more than policy ϕ2  if the
distribution functions of advantage across types are ‘closer’ under ϕ1  than under ϕ2 .   I
will not discuss how we measure the distance between advantage distribution functions
(for that, see Roemer [1998]); there are a number of possibilities.
In other words, equality of opportunity is a state in which the only differences in
advantage are due to effort, and not to circumstance.
Now, to be more precise, we are not simply concerned with equalizing
distribution functions but rather with equalizing them at the highest possible level.  To
avoid a discourse on what it means to equalize a set of distribution functions, let us
simply summarize such a function by its mean.   This leads immediately to the concept of
maximin: that is, an opportunity egalitarian should seek to maximize the mean advantage
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level of that type with the lowest such mean.   Thus, if the mean level of advantage in





µt (ϕ ). (1)
Let us call the value of this program µ * ; it is obviously a function of the set of policies
we have identified as feasible, and the set of circumstances chosen, which determine the
types.
In the example I have given, I chose the level of parental education as the unique
circumstance – in fact there may be many other circumstances, such as natural talent,
race, caste, sex, perhaps region of the country, perhaps urban vs. rural, and so on2.      So,
much of the inequality within types that we observe,  if parental education is taken to be
the unique circumstance, will in fact also be due to (other) circumstances.   In other
words, because in practice we always choose a small set of circumstances, and then
identify the residual difference in advantage within types as due to effort, we are
underestimating the degree of inequality of opportunity.    In the limit, if we thought of
each individual as a type of his own, as we would if we took the view that no choice a
person makes is under his own control,  but all choices are due to circumstances, then we
would attribute all the inequality in a society to circumstances.   The equal-opportunity
objective would then reduce to equality of outcome.   In practice, however, we are always
concerned with measuring inequality of opportunity due to a small and discrete set of
circumstances, and so much of the inequality that we measure will be attributed to
inequality of effort, and hence will not be morally disturbing.
                                                 
2 I say ‘perhaps,’ because one could say urban versus rural is a personal choice, and hence
does not qualify as a circumstance.
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4.   Measuring economic development
The theory of equal opportunity presented above is my attempt to apply the most
current ideas in political philosophy to the measure of social welfare.    These ideas, I
must emphasize, do not simply inhabit the ivory towers of universities:   equality of
opportunity is an idea with massive popular appeal.   Indeed, the political institution of
democracy and the economic institution of the market are often justified by reference to
their capacities to engender equality of opportunity.    The metaphors of ‘leveling the
playing field’  and ‘starting-gate equality’ are popular summaries of equality of
opportunity: the troughs in the playing field to be filled in by social policy are the
disadvantages that some face as the result of circumstances beyond their control.
If we take the equal-opportunity ethic, rather than the utilitarian ethic, as the one
that should motivate our measure of social welfare,  then we should measure the level of
economic development of a society by the value of the program in equation (1) above.
Two questions must be answered in order to do so:  How should we partition the society
into types, and what should we take as the measure of advantage?
Here, I must mention the 2006 World Development Report, issued by the World
Bank, entitled “Equity and development.”  This report attempts to do exactly what I have
described.   It takes equality-of-opportunity as the appropriate guiding ethic, and
measures in many ways the extent to which developing countries are succeeding to
equalize opportunities, roughly,  according to the measure I have here proposed.
For my purposes here, it will suffice to take the level of advantage of an
individual as his or her income  (for I said I would not here challenge that choice, narrow
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as it may be) , and to define the typology of society with respect to the education of one’s
parents.      In this case, then the value of program (1) above, which is our measure of the
extent to which opportunities have been equalized,  and hence our measure of economic
development, is the average level of income of those whose parents were of the lowest
educational stratum3.   Likewise,  the rate of economic development is the rate at which
the average income of those whose parents were of the lowest educational stratum
increases.
For my proposal to be interesting, it must be the case that the rate of economic
development we would measure for countries would differ according to these two
measures: the rate of growth of per capita income of the most disadvantaged type, and the
average rate of growth of per capita income.  My research assistant used household
survey data for a number of developing countries, obtained from the World Bank, to
compute annualized rates of growth of household income (or consumption) for each of
three or four types, defined by the number of years of education of the household head.
Results for several countries are presented below.  (See charts at the end of the paper.)
It is beyond this paper’s scope to study the patterns in these graphs: what is
relevant is simply that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the income growth
experience of the different types.  Therefore, if we choose to measure economic
development as the rate of increase of the equal-opportunity objective function, which is
to say the rate of growth of income (or some measure of well-being) of the most
disadvantaged type, we will in general tell a quite different story from the one told by
focusing upon the growth rate of mean income.
                                                 
3 I am assuming that mean income is lowest for this type, which is a true statement for all
market economies.
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I conclude this section with a second point.   One can ask: How much inequality
is due to inequality of opportunity?   This question can be posed in a precise way.
Inequality of opportunity is the inequality between the different distribution functions of
income of the various types, as opposed to the inequality within these distributions, which
is attributed to differential effort.    The 2006 WDR makes this calculation for several
countries: for developing countries, the answer is that between 15 and 30 percent of total
inequality is due to inequality of opportunity.    I have made this calculation for eleven
advanced democracies : for Sweden, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, less than
1% of income inequality is due to inequality of opportunity, where I partition the male
workers into three types, based upon the educational level of the worker’s parent4.   The
countries in my sample with the largest degree of inequality of opportunity, so measured,
are Italy (6.9% of total inequality) and Spain (7.4%)5.   Indeed, in Figure 2, I present the
distribution functions of pre-fisc income for these three types for Denmark and Spain,
and we see the dramatic nature of the difference.     We may cautiously conjecture from
these calculations that economic development is a process of reducing the extent to which
inequality is due to inequality of opportunity.
Of course, there are several caveats to this observation.  One is that, for the
advanced democracies,  an individual’s type is defined by the educational level of his
parent, while for the developing countries examined in the 2006 WDR, and indeed in my
charts presented in Figure 1, type is define by the individual’s level of education.
                                                 
4 My calculation is made differently from the World Bank’s.  I disaggregate the
coefficient of variation of a population distribution function into two parts – that part due
to inequality of opportunity and that part due to intra-type inequality.  The technique is
described in Roemer [2006].
5 The data used for this calculation are from panel data sets of the various countries; they
are described in detail in Roemer et al (2003).
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Clearly, the latter approach is imperfect – because an individual’s level of education is in
part a voluntary choice, while the parent’s level of education is indeed a circumstance for
the individual in question.   We do not, however, have sufficiently good survey data for
the developing countries, at this time, to define type in the correct way.    It follows that
some of the inequality we call inequality of opportunity for the developing countries, is
really due to differential effort.
5.  Equity versus growth
Many would call a concern with equality of opportunity a concern with equity, to
be contrasted with a concern with growth, where growth is the rate of increase of per
capita income.    Indeed, the aforementioned 2006 World Development Report uses this
nomenclature.    Such commentators are often concerned with the trade-off between
equity and growth.   Perhaps increasing equity (equality of opportunity) will require
reducing the rate of growth; or perhaps, fortuitously, increasing equity is consistent with
increasing the rate of growth.
I stand against this formulation, because, I believe, it follows from ethical
confusion.   Let me review.   I have argued:
A.  Economic development should be construed as the growth of social welfare,
not simply technological development;




C.  The level of economic development is the extent to which those of the most
disadvantaged circumstances have achieved states of high value (e.g., income), and the
rate of economic development is the rate at which that extent increases.
This formulation does not permit a concern with the rate of increase of average
income as such.
Now one could say, “I am part utilitarian and part opportunity egalitarian; so I am
concerned with both per capita income and with the income of the most disadvantaged
type.”    Well, yes, one could say that: but it is a rather clumsy ethical view.    One might,
more cogently, advocate an ethic that lies between utilitarianism and opportunity
egalitarianism, as follows.   Using the notation of section 4, let µt (ϕ )  be the average











where ft  is the fraction of society belonging to type t,  and  r is some number between
negative infinity and one.    If r=1,   this reduces to utilitarianism, and if r = −∞  it
reduces to program (1), that is, equality of opportunity.   As r decreases, we have an
increasing concern with inequality of opportunity.     This might well be an acceptable
ethical view,  although I will not pursue it further here.   Clearly, each choice of r implies
a way of measuring economic development.
Even if one advocates measuring economic development in the way implied by an
opportunity egalitarian ethic,  the question of what comprises the best strategy to equalize
opportunities is an open one.     Neo-liberals argue that free markets will maximize
growth of per capita income, and that that kind of growth is also the best way to
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maximize the growth of income of the most disadvantaged types.   The ‘equity with
growth’ school, represented, for example, by the 2006 WDR report, and by Pranab
Bardhan ,  Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (2000), among others,  argues that a direct
concern with improving the lot of the most disadvantaged will increase growth the
fastest.   Their argument is based, in large part, on market imperfections that prevent the
most disadvantaged from exploiting their talents fully.
 It is not my concern here to evaluate the merits of these opposing schools.    My
point, rather, is to say that we require ethical clarity.   In particular, one does not have to
justify an equal-opportunity conception of economic development by arguing that it will
increase growth (of per capita income).    The equal-opportunity ethic stands on its own
as a conception of social welfare.  And utilitarians do not have to justify their concern
with growth in per capita income by arguing there will be trickle-down and,
consequently, increased equity.   If you are a utilitarian, then trickle-down is irrelevant:
average income (or welfare) is what counts.     The fact that such debates take place is a
symptom of an obscure ethical position.   It is, as well, a symptom of a  kind of
opportunism:  if one is a utilitarian, then one should stick to one’s guns; and likewise, if
one is an opportunity egalitarian.
I present an example from an empirical calculation, to show that my point is not
academic.    In Betts and Roemer (2006), we study educational finance policies that
would equalize opportunities for the acquisition of wage-earning capacity, among young
American men.   Suppose we have partitioned this population into four types, based on
circumstances beyond their control.   We take an educational finance policy to be an
assignment of  educational investments per capita to each of these types, with a budget
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constraint on total investment.   Thus,  a policy is a vector (I1, I2 , I3, I4 )  such that Ij is
invested in each child of type j, and f j∑ I j = I  where I  is the per capita social budget
of educational finance, and f j  is the fraction of type j in the population.    We compute
the optimal (equal opportunity) policy under various typologies, that is, the policy that
maximizes the average wage-earning capacity of the type with the lowest such capacity.
If we use a typology that partitions young men into four types based solely upon the
educational level of their parents, then we compute that the equal-opportunity policy will
actually increase the average wage.   Thus, ‘equity’ goes along with ‘growth.’   However,
if we use a typology that treats as circumstances both parental education and race (black
or white), then the equal-opportunity policy will reduce the average wage.    In this case,
there is a growth-price for achieving equal opportunity.
         Now this result may suggest that the second policy would be politically more
difficult to achieve than the first one – if what happens to the average also reflects what
happens to the majority – but it does not, ipso facto, mean the second policy is ethically
wrong.   A concern with equalizing opportunities and a concern with per capita income
(or wage) growth come from different ethical views.     If one is concerned with political
feasibility, then, I suggest, the right approach is to maximize one’s social welfare
function subject to the constraint that the policy chosen be politically feasible.   Under a
somewhat naïve and simple model of politics, that constraint would say that a majority
should be better off under the proposed policy than under the status quo.
My final example of this section is China, whose growth rate over the last 26
years has been a miraculous 9.4% per annum.   Indeed, the state of being in absolute
poverty now afflicts just 2.8% of the population, in contrast to the prior figure of 31%.
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There is, however, great concern in China about the widening gap between rural and
urban incomes.   There seems to be almost universal agreement, among Chinese social
scientists and the general population,  that the growing gap is ethically wrong, even
though the average income of rural dwellers is rising quite rapidly.  Indeed, many
economic policy discussions in China at present are concerned with this problem.   There
is agreement that maximizing the rate of growth (which, presumably, China has done) is
not the way to maximize the rate of growth of the worst-off class – in this case, the rural
population—and that it would be ethically better to sacrifice some average growth if that
were the price of narrowing the gap between urban and rural.   It may be that the tens of
thousands of rural demonstrations (against land seizures, corruption, and inequality) in
the past few years have forced this new consciousness.   For an enlightening survey of the
heterogeneous Chinese growth experience, disaggregated by province, see UNDP (2005).
The China Human Development Report 2005 (UNDP[2005]) presents income
data for China disaggregated into 31 regions.   One of the report’s emphases is, of course,
regional inequality and inequity.   Using the technique I described earlier, I computed the
fraction of income inequality in China which is due to the inequality of opportunity
associated with living in the 31 different regions.   It is 35.6%.   (This is a similar
magnitude to the fraction of inequality to inequality of opportunity that the World Bank
computed for Brazil.)     Because we view the inequality between regions as serious in
China,  this should help us calibrate what it means for inequality of opportunity to be
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extreme: it means that about one-third of total inequality should be due to inequality of
opportunity6.
6. Conclusion
My central claim is that economic development should be construed as a social
rather than technological concept: economic development occurs when a society becomes
‘better off.’    If one signs on to this view, then one must face the question of defining
what it means for a society to become better off.   The measure of per capita income and
its rate of growth are justified either by a purely technological concern, or a social one
based upon utilitarianism,  a view of social welfare endorsed by only a small minority of
political philosophers (whose business it is to think about such things) today.  I have
proposed that, instead, we measure economic development as the rate at which
opportunities for income acquisition become equalized in a society.   Under quite weak
assumptions, and the theory presented above, this means that we focus upon the rate of
income growth of individuals with the most disadvantaged circumstances.
                                                 
6 My computation was necessarily circuitous, because of the data available.  UNDP
[2005] enabled me to compute the 31 regional GDPs, the population fractions of the 31
regions, and hence the variance in these regional mean incomes.   The Gini coefficient of
Chinese income in 2002 was 0.45.   I next assumed that the size distribution of income is
lognormally distributed in China.  Given Chinese mean income and the Chinese Gini, I
could then calculat the variance in income nationally.  With these data, I could attribute
the fraction of total income to regional inequality of opportunity, using the method of
Roemer (2006).  Of course, the precision of the calculation depends upon the assumption
of lognormality for the Chinese income distribution; I don’t know how good that
assumption is.
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Figure 1 consists of the charts below.
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